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"THE LONGEST JOURNEY, WITH A
FIRST STEP": BRINGING COHERENCE TO
SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICITONAL ISSUES
IN GLOBAL EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW
PAUL M. SECUNDA*
INTRODUCTION
Global employee benefits law is an emerging field of study that
requires coherence at the threshold level of coverage. The statutory
maze of sovereignty and jurisdictional issues involved with U.S.
employee benefit laws, for instance, make it difficult to determine
when American employee benefit laws apply to U.S. citizens abroad
or to foreign citizens in the United States. This raises significant
problems in particular given the growing tendency of the U.S.
Congress to export U.S. labor and employment standards to other
1
parts of the world through legislative amendment. Additionally, this
state of affairs is made even worse by the fact that no formal
international legal machinery exists to deal with these issues, leaving
corporations alone to navigate U.S. and foreign employee benefits
2
law. Although a single global employee benefits law regime is not

Copyright © 2008 by Paul M. Secunda
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. This paper derives in
part from the First Chapter of ESTREICHER, SECUNDA, AND CONNOR, GLOBAL ISSUES IN
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW (THOMSON-WEST FORTHCOMING 2009). I would like to thank Rick
Bales, Albert Feuer, Nancy Levit, and Susan Stabile, for providing insightful comments to
earlier drafts of this paper. I would especially like to thank Carla Reyes, Editor-in-Chief of this
Journal, for assisting me in making this article’s arguments stronger.
1. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
2. Jennifer L. Hagerman, Navigating the Waters of International Employment Law:
Dispute Avoidance Tactics for United States-Based Multinational Corporations, 41 VAL. U. L.
REV. 859, 860-61 (2006) (“There is currently no formal international legal system in place. Many
complexities and risks arise when United States-based corporations operate abroad, as
Multinational Corporations (‘MNCs’) must contend with United States employment laws,
foreign employment laws, and the operation of these laws in the international context. For the
most part, United States law cannot be applied to operations in other countries due to
sovereignty issues and jurisdictional obstacles. Similar obstacles arise when foreign countries
attempt to apply their laws to American companies.”).
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presently realistic,3 it is possible to start piecing together this regime
by determining when and where U.S. employee benefits law applies,
beginning with a consideration of the scope of the chief employee
benefits law in the United States, the Employee Retirement Income
4
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
While the expansion of U.S. labor standards beyond U.S. borders
is not without controversy, few would question the authority of
5
Congress to extend these protections overseas if it intended to do so.
There is reason to suspect that Congress did intend to extend ERISA
coverage beyond U.S. borders; although ERISA has no explicit
provision extending coverage overseas, it does have broad
jurisdictional language. ERISA § 4(a),6 states in pertinent part:
“[T]his title shall apply to any employee benefit plan if it is
established or maintained—(1) by any employer engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce.”7 In most
cases, this language has been interpreted to find that ERISA does not
apply to employee benefits matters that arise outside of the United
States.8 But that is not the end of the story. Many questions about
coverage still exist given the vagueness of ERISA’s provisions when it
comes to matters of extraterritorial application, whether related to
the application of ERISA to foreign employees in the United States
or the application of ERISA to foreign companies operating to some
degree in the United States.
Thus, three additional dimensions of ERISA coverage involving
the global context must be explored relating to: (1) issues of legal
foreign employees in the United States; (2) issues of foreign
government employer immunity under the Foreign Sovereign

3. Id. at 861.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000). ERISA covers private-sector, employer-provided
pension and welfare benefit employee benefit plans. Id. at § 1003(a).
5. See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)
(“Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United
States. Whether Congress has in fact exercised that authority in these cases is a matter of
statutory construction.”).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a).
7. Following the practice of other ERISA books and scholars, this article refers to the
original section numbers as enacted by ERISA in the “ERISA §” format, rather than to the
United States Code section numbers.
8. See, e.g., Maurais v. Snyder, No. C.A. 00-2133, 2000 WL 1368024, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
14, 2000).
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Immunities Act (FSIA);9 and (3) issues surrounding foreign
undocumented workers.
This article proceeds in two parts. First, it explores the
extraterritorial application of ERISA to domestic and foreign
workers abroad, highlighting the confusing nature of the current legal
10
framework. Part I concludes with a proposal for an extraterritorial
application model similar to the one used by Title VII of the Civil
11
Rights Act of 1964 and other U.S. employment discrimination
statutes, which would simplify greatly this area of the law. Part II then
considers the plight of foreign employees in the United States,
including issues surrounding the “foreign plan” exception under
ERISA § 4(b)(4), the application of FSIA to foreign sovereign
companies’ American operations, and the status of undocumented
workers in the United States under ERISA. This second part
concludes that courts should abandon the Hoffman Plastics v. NLRB12
holding in the ERISA context for undocumented workers and that
future immigration reform should ensure that documented workers
employed by U.S. companies receive the same employee benefit
rights under ERISA as their American counterparts. Taken together,
these two sections offer proposals with one goal in mind: beginning
the work toward making a globally-integrated U.S. employee benefit
scheme a reality in our lifetimes.
I. UNITED STATES CITIZENS WORKING ABROAD
A. Application of ERISA to Events Outside the United States
1. Maurais v. Snyder
When discussing the extraterritorial reach of ERISA, a good
13
place to start is Maurais v. Snyder, one of the few cases that has
addressed the topic. In Maurais, Dr. Maurais, a citizen of Canada,
filed a lawsuit for $75,750.00 for unpaid surgical and other medical
services that he provided to Corey Snyder, a U.S. citizen, in Canada.14

9. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000).
10. See infra Part I.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
12. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
13. No. C.A. 00-2133, 2000 WL 1368024 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2000).
14. Id. at *1. “On July 5, 1998, Snyder was involved in a high speed boat racing accident in
Canada. Snyder was rushed to a hospital in Montreal where he came under the care of Dr.

SECUNDA_FMT5.DOC

110

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

11/19/2008 3:31:43 PM

[Vol 19:107

“At the time the services were rendered, Snyder was a participant in a
group health insurance plan issued to his employer, Highway Marines
15
Service, by Guardian Life Insurance Company.” When Dr. Maurais
failed to receive compensation from Snyder or the Plan for the
16
surgical procedures performed, he brought claims against Snyder in
federal court for implied contract, quantum meruit, unjust
enrichment, conversion and punitive damages; similarly, he brought
state law claims against Guardian based on theories of implied
contact and negligent misrepresentation.17
In response, Guardian sought to dismiss the claims against it on
the grounds that ERISA preempted the two state law claims brought
18
against it. Before ruling on the ERISA preemption defense, the
court determined that it had to consider the threshold issue of
whether ERISA applied at all to activities that occurred in Canada:
“Since the surgery was performed on an American citizen in Canada
by a Canadian doctor, we must consider whether ERISA has
extraterritorial application.”19 Because no court had ruled on that
issue, the court found a Supreme Court decision on a related topic
20
instructive. The decision that the Marais court looked to was
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO),21 in which
the Supreme Court considered whether Congress intended the
extraterritorial application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,22 a statute prohibiting various forms of employment

Maurais. Dr. Maurais contacted Guardian and received authorization from Guardian to
perform certain surgical procedures on Snyder.” Id. Dr. Maurais subsequently performed
numerous surgical procedures on Snyder and Snyder remained under Dr. Maurais care until he
was transferred to a hospital in Philadelphia. Id.
15. Id. There is no dispute that the Guardian Plan is an “employee welfare benefit”
governed by ERISA. Id.
16. As it turns out, “On March 15, 1999, Guardian sent Snyder a check in the amount of
$38,002.00 along with an Explanation of Benefits statement which identified Dr. Maurais as the
medical care provider, and set forth the services rendered by Dr. Maurais, the dates of service,
and the approved allowance for each service.” Id. Snyder spent the money on himself. Id.
17. Id. at *2.
18. Id. ERISA § 514 is a broadly-worded preemption provision that permits ERISA to
supersede most state laws which “relate[] to” employee benefit plans. ERISA § 514(a). State
laws are defined expansively to include “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations or other State
action having the effect of law, of any State.” Id. § 514(c)(1).
19. Maurais, 2000 WL 1368024, at *2.
20. Id.
21. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-200e-17 (2000).
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discrimination against protected groups.23 In that case, the Court
ultimately concluded that Congress did not intend for Title VII to
24
apply overseas. As the Court held:
It is a longstanding principle of American law “that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.” This “canon of construction . . . is a valid
approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be
ascertained.” It serves to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could
result in international discord.
In applying this rule of construction, we look to see whether
“language in the [relevant Act] gives any indication of a
congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond places
over which the United States has sovereignty or has some
measure of legislative control.” We assume that Congress
legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Therefore, unless there is “the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed,” we must
presume it “is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions.”25
Thus, ARAMCO stands for the proposition that unless Congress
“clearly expressed” an “affirmative intention,” courts should presume
that a statute is primarily concerned with domestic matters.26 Because
there was no language in ERISA that could establish a clearly
expressed intent on behalf of Congress to legislate extraterritorially,
the Maurais court found that ERISA did not apply to Dr. Maurais’
medical services claims in Canada.27
The Maurais court came to this conclusion even though ERISA
28
contains a very broad jurisdictional statement. Relying on this
provision, Guardian maintained that the claim was within the

23. ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 246.
24. Id. at 259.
25. ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248 (citations omitted).
26. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
27. Maurais v. Snyder, No. C.A. 00-2133, 2000 WL 1368024, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2000).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1) (2000) (ERISA applies “to any employee benefit plan if it is
established or maintained - (1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or
activity affecting commerce”).
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jurisdiction of ERISA because, technically speaking, it met all the
elements of ERISA § 4(a)(1): (1) it was an employee benefit plan; (2)
it was established and maintained in the United States by Snyder’s
employer; (3) his employer engaged in commerce; and (4) the plan
29
was not otherwise exempted from coverage by ERISA.
The court rejected this textualist argument, holding instead that
the “broad jurisdictional language” of ERISA § 4(a)(1) does not
operate to extend statutory protections for employee benefits granted
30
by a United States employer to events arising anywhere in the world.
Noting that a similar argument made under the equally broad
jurisdictional language of Title VII was also rejected by the
ARAMCO Court,31 the court in Maurais observed that ARAMCO
stands for a “presumption against extraterritorial application and in
the absence of particular language in a statute that overcomes that
presumption, the statute should not be applied in an extraterritorial
manner.”32 In support of this reading, one of the cases cited by the
ARAMCO Court was specifically telling: New York Central Railroad
Company v. Chishlom.33 In that case, the Supreme Court found that
where a U.S. citizen employed on a U.S. railroad suffered fatal
injuries thirty miles north of the Canadian border, the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)34 did not apply.35 Similarly, the court found
that ERISA did not apply in Maurais.

29. The exemption for foreign plans under ERISA § 4(b)(4) is discussed in more detail
below. One could conceivably argue, employing a reverse inference, that Congress intended
extraterritorial application of ERISA in situations like Maurais based on the fact that it did not
specifically exempt from ERISA these circumstances when it clearly could have done so in the
same manner as ERISA § 4(b)(4). Nevertheless, this alternative view of ERISA’s application
outside the United States does not appear to meet the “clearly evinced intention of Congress to
the contrary” standard of ARAMCO and, thus, the Maurais Court did not adopt it, see Maurais,
2000 WL 1368024, at *3.
30. Maurais, 2000 WL 1368024, at *3.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing N. Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925) (establishing that
the Federal Employees Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 does not have extraterritorial application
because the Act “contains no words which definitely disclose an intention to give it
extraterritorial effect”); McCullough v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10 (1963) (refusing to find a congressional intent to apply the National Labor Relations Act
abroad because there was no specific language in the Act reflecting Congressional intent to do
so).
33. 268 U.S. 29 (1925).
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
35. Chisholm, 268 U.S. at 30. Maurais does not represent the first time a court has utilized
case law from the NLRA context before to determine the scope of ERISA. See Metropolitan
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Beyond the language of the jurisdictional provision, Guardian
also sought to rely on precedent holding that ERISA applied to
benefits claims arising out of plans established on Indian Tribe
reservations. Specifically, Guardian pointed to Smart v. State Farm
36
Insurance Co., which held ERISA applicable to Indian Tribe
employers and Native American employees.37 The Maurais Court
distinguished Smart, however, by noting that Indian Tribes, unlike
38
nations, do not have absolute immunity from Congressional power.
Instead, Congress has plenary power to limit, modify, or even
eliminate the powers of Indian Tribe self-governance because the
tribes’ limited sovereignty is subject to complete defeasance by
Congress.39 Also, while Indian reservations are located within the
United States, Canada is a separate sovereign nation. Consequently,
the consensus view is that ERISA applies to Indian reservations
within the United States, even though tribes retain a substantial
degree of sovereignty.40
Accordingly, Maurais held that, because a presumption exists
against extraterritorial application absent clear Congressional intent,
and ERISA does not contain a clear expression of that intent, ERISA
does not apply extraterritorially.41 But one has to wonder, given the

Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987) (finding ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)’s complete
preemption of breach of contract claims in benefit denial cases similar to the complete
preemption of contract claims by § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Amendments in collective
bargaining agreement breach cases).
36. 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989).
37. Id. at 938 (“ERISA, a statute of general application without an expressed congressional
intent with respect to coverage of Indian Tribe employers, does not affect a Tribe’s ability to
govern itself in intramural matters, nor does it affect a specific right secured to the Lake
Superior Chippewa Tribe by treaty or other statute. Consequently, ERISA applies to the
Chippewa Health Center employee benefits plan.”).
38. Although Indian Tribes are “‘distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights’ in matters of local self-government,” Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832)), they are
no longer possessed of the “full attributes of sovereignty.” United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375 (1886).
39. Smart, 868 F.2d at 932 (citing Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983)).
40. Id. at 932 (“Congress intended ERISA to include an employment benefit plan which is
established and maintained by an Indian Tribe employer for the benefit of Indian employees
working at an establishment located entirely on an Indian reservation.”). There is an argument
that the court’s decision in Smart is suspect because, pre-ARAMCO, it is doing exactly what the
Maurais court said it should not do: inferring Congress’s intent as to ERISA’s applicability to
Indian Tribe employers when there is arguably no clear intent evidenced.
41. See Maurais v. Snyder, No. C.A. 00-2133, 2000 WL 1368024, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14,
2000).
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increasing importance of global trade and the internationalization of
the economy in the United States, whether there will be pressure to
export the labor and employment standards of the United States,
including ERISA standards, to other countries?42 As the next section
explains, similar pressures seem to have led to new extraterritorial
provisions in U.S. employment discrimination laws.
2. The Proposal: ERISA § 4(b)(6)
Although the scope of ERISA’s extraterritorial application could
theoretically be expanded by a court applying a different
interpretation of ERISA’s jurisdiction from that of Maurais,43 it would
be far better for Congress to expand the scope of ERISA coverage
explicitly through amendments to ERISA like those employed for
other U.S. employment discrimination statutes. Indeed, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,44 the Age Discrimination in Employment
45
Act of 1967 (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
46
1990 (ADA) all have been amended and now contain provisions that
permit extraterritorial application in specified circumstances.47 Title
VII’s provision is representative:
(b) Compliance with statute as violative of foreign law
It shall not be unlawful . . . for an employer (or a
corporation controlled by an employer) . . . to take any
42. See generally Phillis R. Morgan & R. Bradley Mokros, International Employment,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN REVIEW: 2000 BUSINESS REGULATION, 35 INT’L
LAW. 351 (2001).
43. For instance, a court could disagree with Maurais’s reliance on ARAMCO and read the
ERISA foreign plan exemption, § 4(b)(4), to imply that employee benefit plans maintained by
employers which are not primarily for the benefit of foreigners outside of the United States, but
for U.S. citizens, would apparently, by reverse inference, be covered. Under this reading, an
employee benefit plan maintained for a United States employer’s Toronto employees, most of
whom are United States citizens, would be subject to ERISA requirements for employerprovided benefit plans. For a fuller discussion of this alternative, see generally infra Part II.A.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b), (c) (2000).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), (h) (2000).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c) (2000).
47. Congress amended these laws in response to what it saw as an incorrect interpretation
of employment discrimination law’s application to U.S. citizens working abroad. See Michelle
Shender, Claims By Non-Citizens Under The Americans With Disabilities Act: Proper
Extraterritorial Application In Torrico V. International Business Machines?, 17 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 131, 137 (2005) (“In response to the decision in Aramco, Congress added section 109 to
the Civil Rights Act in 1991, and thereby amended both Title VII and the ADA to apply
extraterritorially to U.S. citizens abroad. The EEOC, in its Enforcement Guidance, explained
that the purpose behind section 109 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act was to respond to the Aramco
decision.”).
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action otherwise prohibited . . ., with respect to an
employee in a workplace in a foreign country if
compliance with such section would cause such employer
(or such corporation), . . . to violate the law of the foreign
country in which such workplace is located.
(c) Control of corporation incorporated in foreign country
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of
incorporation is a foreign country, any practice
prohibited by section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title
engaged in by such corporation shall be presumed to be
engaged in by such employer.
(2) Sections 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 of this title shall not
apply with respect to the foreign operations of an
employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an
American employer.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the determination of
whether an employer controls a corporation shall be
based on—
(A) the interrelation of operations;
(B) the common management;
(C) the centralized control of labor relations;
and
(D) the common ownership or financial control,
48
of the employer and the corporation.
This language has been interpreted by various courts to mean that
statutory coverage extends to Americans employed abroad by
American companies or their subsidiaries.49 The reasoning behind
these laws appears to be based on an interest in eliminating
employment discrimination against U.S. citizens wherever it may
occur. 50
On the other hand, these statutory schemes do not extend “to
foreign nationals working abroad for American companies or their
51
52
subsidiaries.” Hu v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP,
for instance, provides an application of this principle under the

48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(b), (c) (2000).
49. See, e.g., Helm v. S. Af. Airways, No. 84-5404, 1987 WL 13195, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(ADEA context).
50. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 87-88 (1998).
51. Iskandar v. Am. Univ. of Beirut, No. 98-6616, 1999 WL 595651, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(ADEA context).
52. 76 F. Supp. 2d 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

SECUNDA_FMT5.DOC

116

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

11/19/2008 3:31:43 PM

[Vol 19:107

ADEA. In Hu, a Chinese citizen living in United States claimed that
a law firm engaged in age discrimination in not hiring him for an
53
overseas position. Relying on extraterritorial provisions of the
54
ADEA, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not claim the
statute’s protection because, as a foreign citizen, the protection of
55
ADEA did not extend to him. Thus, while having broader
application than ERISA, these statutory schemes still are not applied
evenly to all workers regardless of citizenship or location. Where the
statues do not apply, however, there are good reasons for not further
extending U.S. law including: “international law limitations on
extraterritoriality, which Congress should be assumed to have
observed . . . [and] the need ‘to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in
international discord.’”56
At the end of the day, it is unclear whether ERISA will be
amended to allow for extraterritorial application in some instances.
Until that happens, there will likely be more decisions like Maurais
finding a presumption against the extraterritorial application of
ERISA given the established case law upon which Maurais rests. This
state of affairs makes little sense when similar employment statutes
like Title VII, the ADEA, and ADA have been amended to provide
for extraterritorial application in the case of American employees
who are working abroad for American companies or their
subsidiaries. These situations lack the potential sovereignty and
jurisdictional obstacles that courts worry about in these
57
Additionally, like its consistency with the
circumstances.
extraterritorial extension of employment discrimination statutes, this
proposed extension of ERISA to American citizens working abroad

53. Id. at 476-77.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), (h) (2000).
55. Hu, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 478; see also Iwata v. Stryker Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 600 (N.D. Tex.
1999) (holding that a former, non-U.S. employee, who had lived and carried out his duties in
Japan, while employed with Japanese subsidiary of American corporation, was not protected by
Title VII or ADEA).
56. Dodge, supra note 50, at 90 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO),
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
57. See Helm v. S. Af. Airways, No. 84-5404, 1987 WL 13195, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25,
1987) (“Congress was careful not ‘to impose its labor standards on another country.’
Accordingly, Congress did not extend ADEA’s protections to foreign nationals working abroad
for American companies or their subsidiaries.” (quoting P.L. 98-459, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Adm. News, p. 3000)).
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would be consistent with providing pension and welfare benefit
protection to American citizens wherever they may reside.
This article therefore proposes that § 4(b)(6) be added to the
ERISA jurisdictional provisions to read:
(b) The provision of this title shall not apply to any employee
benefit plan if –
(6) such plan is maintained by an employer (or a
corporation controlled by an employer) with respect to
an employee in a workplace in a foreign country if
compliance with such section would cause such employer
(or such corporation) to violate the law of the foreign
country in which such workplace is located.
This provision would be interpreted to mean that ERISA statutory
coverage has been extended to Americans employed abroad by
American companies or their subsidiaries (as long as there is not
conflicting foreign law), but not to foreign nationals working abroad
for American companies or their subsidiaries. Such an amendment
would have the additional benefit of being able to depend on existing
case law under other statutory regimes with similar provisions for
further interpretation.
This proposed amendment also would bring clarity to situations
where U.S. employees are temporarily working outside of the United
States. There does not appear to be a case directly on point involving
ERISA. However, in the traditional labor law context, which ERISA
58
law often tracks, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
59
the NLRA does not apply to employees of a U.S. company while
60
they are performing temporary work outside the United States. The
court came to this decision based on the presumption against
extraterritoriality in ARAMCO and McCullough.61 Like the NLRA,
ERISA “include[s] no mechanism for extraterritorial enforcement,
and [there is] not . . . a method for resolving any conflicts with labor
laws of other nations,”62 as there is under Title VII and other anti63
discrimination statutes. This suggests that ERISA does not apply to

58. See supra note 32.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
60. See Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. NLRB, 365 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2004).
61. Id. at 173-78.
62. Id. at 175; see also Cleary v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1259 (D.N.J. 1983)
(confirming that “a United States citizen working abroad cannot enforce the provisions of the
[Fair Labor Standards Act]”).
63. See supra notes 22-26.
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U.S. employees temporarily assigned overseas. Policymakers may
with this interpretation, but, if policymakers wanted coverage to
extend in these circumstances, an amendment to ERISA providing
for extraterritorial application would easily resolve these cases.

II. FOREIGN EMPLOYEES WORKING IN THE UNITED
STATES
To be completely accurate, the issue of foreign employees in the
United States does not even raise issues of extraterritoriality because
an extraterritorial application of a statute involves the regulation of
conduct beyond the borders of the United States. Consequently, it
could be argued that the presumption against extraterritoriality does
64
not apply in this context. However, the presence of these foreign
employees in the United States raises three additional issues that
deserve attention for those interested in a more global approach to
employee benefits law: (1) the application of ERISA to foreigner
employees and companies legally located in the United States; (2) the
application of the Foreign Surveillance Immunity Act (FSIA), 28
U.S.C. § 1604, to foreign sovereign employers; and (3) the application
of ERISA to undocumented workers in the United States.
A. Foreign Employees and Employers Permissibly in the United
States
When a foreign corporation employs a foreign citizen in the
United States and guarantees that employee certain benefits, it is
unclear whether those benefits are covered by ERISA. Although
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA, have all been interpreted to
apply to foreign employers doing business in the United States
regardless of the citizenship of the plaintiff,65 the foreign plan
exception under ERISA § 4(b)(4), the only specific provision in
64. For instance, some of these cases do not even discuss ARAMCO’s presumption against
extraterritoriality. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000) (applying Title
III of the ADA’s public accommodation provisions to a foreign-flag cruise ship in United States
waters); Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998) (agreeing with the EEOC, and finding that,
“ADEA generally protects the employees of a branch of a foreign employer located in the
United States”); Ward v. W & H Voortman, Ltd., 685 F. Supp. 231 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (holding
“that any company, foreign or domestic, that elects to do business in this country falls within
Title VII’s reach and should, and must, do business here according to its rules prohibiting
discrimination”).
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ERISA that deals with employee benefit plans maintained outside
the United States, is less clear. ERISA § 4(b)(4) states that “[t]he
provisions of this title shall not apply to any employee benefit plan
if . . . (4) such plan is maintained outside the United States primarily
for the benefit of individuals substantially all of whom are
nonresident aliens.”66
Under the foreign plan exception, two elements must be met for
the plan to be exempt from ERISA: (1) the employee benefit plan
must be primarily for the benefit of persons substantially all of whom
are nonresident aliens; and (2) the plan must be maintained outside of
the United States. When adjudicating related claims under this
exception, most litigation has focused on whether the plan in question
is maintained inside or outside of the United States. Consider how the
court analyzed the foreign plan exception in Molyneux v. Arthur
Guinness & Sons, P.L.C.:
There is no dispute that AGS is based in Britain, not in the
United States. Although it is not disputed that Molyneux
resides in New York, it appears that he is a British subject.
Nowhere in the complaint or in the lengthy affidavits before
the court is there any suggestion that the severance pay
“plan,” should it exist, covers even one U.S. citizen
employed in the United States, or that a severance payment
has ever been made by AGS to any alien in the United
States. ERISA explicitly excludes from its coverage any
employee benefit plan if “such plan is maintained outside of
the United States primarily for the benefit of persons
substantially all of whom are non-resident aliens.” [ERISA §
4(b)(4)]. Thus, on the facts alleged, ERISA is irrelevant. 67
In a footnote, however, the Molyneux Court went further and
observed:
Even if it were possible to construe the clear language of
[ERISA §4(b)(4)] to permit suits such as this one, there is
little to suggest that the purposes of ERISA extend to
disputes between British subjects and British employers.
Repeated references are made in the legislative history to
American working men and women and to aspects of the
Social Security system. . . . It is also noted that ERISA was

66. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(4) (2006).
67. 616 F. Supp. 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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not intended to cover “plans established or maintained
outside of the United States for the benefit of non-United
68
States citizens. . . .”
The corollary to exempting benefit plans maintained outside of
the United States for foreign citizens working in the United States
would appear to be the rule that foreign employees working in the
United States for a foreign employer or American employer generally
come under ERISA if the plan is maintained inside the United States.
69
A court recently adopted this corollary in Lasheen v. Loomis Co.
In Lasheen, Mohammed Lasheen’s estate sued Loomis, a U.S.based benefits service company, for breach of fiduciary duty and
breach of contract under ERISA for healthcare benefits owed under
a medical benefits plan established by the Egyptian Embassy in the
United States.70 Loomis was hired by the Embassy of Egypt to
manage its benefit plan for students and teachers who were
71
temporarily in the United States. Importantly, the plan provided
that to be eligible as a participant, the employee could have “neither
received nor applied for naturalization or permanent residency status
in the United States, Puerto Rico, or Canada, or for any other change
[in immigration] status in the United States as an ‘F’ or ‘J’ visa
holder.”72 The issue before the Court was whether this was a foreign
plan exempted from ERISA.73 Because the plan prohibited
participants from making a change in their immigration status, the
court easily concluded that the plan exclusively provided benefits for
non-resident aliens.74 Thus, the plan satisfied the first element of the §
4(b)(4) exemption: it was “primarily for the benefit of persons
75
substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens.”
68. Id. at 244 n.7 (citations omitted); see also Pitstick v. Potash Corp. of Sask. Sales, Ltd.,
698 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (where a Canadian corporation’s severance plan fell within
the exemption of ERISA § 4(b)(4) when only 30 of 1,666 covered employees were United States
citizens and plan was established and maintained in Canada even though the principal place of
business was in the United States).
69. No. Civ. 01-227, 2006 WL 618289 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2006).
70. Id. at *1. Lasheen’s estate claim for benefits for treatment of liver cancer was either
denied or ignored. The estate alleged that the denial of benefits led to his death. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *3.
74. Id.
75. Id. Other cases have also concluded that plans can only meet the § 4(b)(4) exemption
if they are primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens. See, e.g., In re Lefkowitz, 767 F. Supp.
501, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 996 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that ERISA § 4(b)(4)
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The harder question in Lasheen was whether the plan met the
second element of the foreign plan exemption of being “maintained
76
outside of the United States.” As with many areas in the newlydeveloping field of global employee benefits law, the court and the
parties were unable to locate any case on point; therefore, the court
treated the issue as a matter of first impression.77 As such, it relied in
part on a number of opinion letters from the Office of Pension and
Welfare Benefit Programs (“OPWBP”) and from the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”).78
From these OPWBP and PBGC opinion letters, the court
derived six factors to consider in determining whether an employee
benefit plan is maintained in the United States:
(1) All plan records concerning participation accrual, vesting
and other matters necessary to determine and pay plan
benefits are maintained outside the United States;
(2) The work locations of the employees are outside of the
United States;
(3) The plan is administered by a company located outside
the United States;
(4) All operations of the companies are located outside of the
United States;
(5) The trust is established outside the United States;
79
(6) Assets of the plan are held outside the United States.
The initial part of the court’s analysis employing these factors
focused on whether diplomatic property—the Embassy of Egypt—
80
could be considered property outside of the United States. Although
81
the court concluded that it could be, it also found that this factor and
the other factors were not dispositive on the ERISA exemption

exemption did not apply to employee pension plans adopted by foreign corporations where
employee was United States citizen).
76. Lasheen, 2006 WL 618289 at *4.
77. Id. (“Neither the parties nor this court have discovered any cases which interpret what
it means to be ‘maintained outside of the United States.’”).
78. Id. That being said, the court appears less than enamored by the analysis conducted
therein. Id. (“Unfortunately, the letter opinions provide little analysis or explanation behind the
conclusions they declare.”). In any event, such opinion letters only have weight to the extent
that they are persuasive. Id. (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at *4-6.
81. Id. at *6.
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issue.82 Instead, the court decided the case based on two new factors:
whether the plan said that ERISA applied and where most of the
83
plan’s activities were carried out.
On the first factor, “the plan, in unambiguous language, declares
itself an ERISA plan. There is, to say the least, something appealing
84
about taking the plan at its word.” As to the second factor, where
most of the activities of the plan were carried out, the court observed
that “Loomis was doing most of the administration of the plan,”
“Loomis represented itself as the administrator of the plan in a letter
sent to the plaintiff’s attorney dated Nov. 3, 2000,” and “the BSMA
[Benefit Service Management Agreement] provides that the
provisions of the plan shall be enforced under the laws of the
85
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Consequently, the court concluded
that most of the activities of the plan took place in the United States.86
Thus, the court in Lasheen found that, although the Embassy of
Egypt plan existed primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens like
Lasheen, the fact that it was maintained inside the United States
made the ERISA exception for foreign plans was not applicable,
87
allowing Lasheen’s estate to continue with its claims under ERISA.
Thus, Lasheen supports an interpretation of ERISA § 4(b)(4) that
indicates that ERISA applies when a foreign employee works for a
foreign corporation in the United States that maintains an employee
benefit plan inside the United States.
B. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) Issues
An additional difficult question of ERISA coverage for both
foreign and domestic employees in the United States arises when the
employer is an arm of a foreign government. Under the Foreign

82. Id. at *7 (“Attempting to apply the criteria derived from the opinion letters to the
evidence adduced does not result in a certain result.”).
83. Id. at *8.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Because this was a case of first impression, the district court gave the Loomis
Company and the Egyptian government the chance to take an immediate appeal to the
appellate court on the issue of ERISA coverage over the Egyptian Embassy Plan. Id.
Unfortunately, at least from an academic standpoint, Lasheen’s Estate and Loomis came to a
settlement agreement later, conditioned upon their ability to recover against the Egyptian
defendants. Lasheen v. Loomis Co. (Lasheen II), No. CIV. S-01-227, 2008 WL 295079, at *1
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2008).
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Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA),88 “foreign states are
presumed to be immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts
89
unless one of the Act’s exceptions to immunity applies.” FSIA was
not relevant in the Lasheen court’s analysis of the foreign plan
exception because the issue there was one of statutory construction,
not one of immunity. Foreign immunity did subsequently become an
important issue once Lasheen and Loomis sought to recover the cost
of the benefits from the Egyptian government in accordance with
their settlement agreement. In Lasheen v. Loomis Co. (Lasheen II),90
the court explained the application of the FSIA to the facts of this
case this way:
The FSIA bars suit against a foreign sovereign nation subject
to certain exceptions. Accordingly, it “provides the sole basis
for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of
this country.” Courts operate under the presumption that
the actions of foreign states and their instrumentalities fall
within FSIA’s protections unless one of its exceptions
applies.
***
[T]he Agreement between Loomis and the Egyptian
defendants contains a provision that constitutes waiver by
implication. Specifically, the Agreement states that it “shall
be enforced under the laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.” Under Joseph, this language waives any
claim to immunity.
***
Second, under FSIA’s “commercial activity” exception,
foreign states are not entitled to immunity “where [ ] action
is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state.”
***
The Agreement between Loomis and the Egyptian
defendants is the type of activity that a private party could
also undertake. The Agreement states that Loomis would
provide “administrative services” regarding the Egyptian

88. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000).
89. Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1459 (9th Cir. 1995).
90. 2008 WL 295079, at *1 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Co.,
488 U.S. 428, 443 (1988)).
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defendants’ Health Care Benefits Plan. Private companies
often make similar arrangements; undertaking such conduct
does not require the exercise of the power of a sovereign
nation. The court therefore finds that the Agreement
between Loomis and the Egyptian defendants falls within
FSIA’s “commercial activity” exception.91
Based on this opinion, one would assume that Lasheen and Loomis
finally would be able to recover from the Egyptian defendants.
Whether this decision means that all administration and operation of
employee benefit plans going forward will come under the
“commercial activity” exception to FSIA is less clear.
Courts have weighed in on both sides of this issue. In Mukaddam
92
v. Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, for
instance, a Second Circuit district court found that a clerical
employee’s duties in the office of the Permanent Mission of Saudia
Arabia to the United Nations came under the FSIA commercial
activity exception.93 In Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,94 by contrast, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially held that a Canadian
95
corporation was a foreign sovereign subject immune under FSIA.
This was no small matter in the case, since the Canadian sovereign
subject company could not be held liable to its U.S. subsidiary
employees for failure to give COBRA continuation of health
insurance notices,96 nor could it be held liable for interfering with
employee benefit rights under ERISA § 510, unless one of the FSIA
97
exceptions applied. Ultimately, the Gates court determined that the
activity in question did not come under the FSIA “commercial
activity” exception because the Canadian sovereign company was not
involved in its American subsidiary’s operations, including its

91. Id. at *2-4 (citations omitted).
92. 111 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
93. Id. at 466.
94. 54 F.3d 1457.
95. Id. at 1462-63 (“[W]e hold that Alberta Pork is an agency or instrumentality under the
Act and thus is immune from jurisdiction unless one of the Act exceptions applies.”). “[Alberta
Pork] is a Canadian entity established pursuant to the Alberta Marketing of Agricultural
Products Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. M-5, to provide for the effective marketing and promotion of hogs
produced in the Province of Alberta.” Id. at 1459.
96. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (2000)
(“ERISA”).
97. See id. at § 1140.
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decision to terminate its employee benefit plan.98 As such, the court
did not hold the Canadian sovereign company liable.
The Gates holding indicates that the FSIA commercial activity
exception turns on the amount of control a foreign parent has over a
U.S. subsidiary. Had the Canadian sovereign company exercised
more centralized control over the U.S. subsidiary operations,
including over the decision whether to terminate the plan, the
commercial activity exception may have applied and the plan covered
by ERISA. This aspect of FSIA gives foreign government employers
an incentive to export management control over its U.S. subsidiary
operations to remain immune from American employee benefit law.
C. Undocumented Workers
The growing issue of illegal immigration in the United States and
the increasing number of undocumented employees being employed
by American companies raise important questions in the employee
benefits context. Unlike American labor law, which has a watershed
decision addressing the issue of whether undocumented workers are
eligible for back pay for violations of the NLRA,99 American
employee benefits law is silent.100
For instance, the courts have yet to address whether
undocumented workers eligible to receive employee benefits, or
ERISA remedies, from ERISA-covered plans operating in the
United States. At the same time, the Court’s opinion in the NLRA
case of Hoffman Plastics provides some important clues. The decision
in Hoffman Plastics was not merely based on the language of the
NLRA, but also on federal immigration policy in general, as
expressed in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986

98. 54 F.3d at 1465.
99. Hoffman Plastics Compound, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (holding that
undocumented workers are ineligible for back pay remedy for union-based discrimination under
the National Labor Relations Act).
100. This is perhaps unsurprising, as the labor market for undocumented workers is largely
illicit, and these workers would seem to care more about a living wage than health insurance,
pension plans, or other employee benefits. Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th
Cir. 1988) (“We doubt . . . that many illegal aliens come to this country to gain the protection of
our labor laws. Rather it is the hope of getting a job—at any wage—that prompts most illegal
aliens to cross our borders.”). Nevertheless, it is exactly these undocumented workers who
might have the most glaring need for health insurance for themselves and their families given
their circumstances. Furthermore, the short-term, transitional nature of their work puts a
premium on having a portable retirement plan.
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(IRCA).101 Therefore, the analysis used by the Court in Hoffman
Plastics provides a model by which the issue of ERISA application
can be approached.
The IRCA prohibits the employment of undocumented workers
102
in the United States, and enforces this law through an extensive
employment verification system that requires employers to verify the
identity and eligibility of all new hires by examining certain
documents before they are permitted to start work.103 Employers who
violate the IRCA are subject to both civil penalties and criminal
104
prosecution. As the Hoffman Plastics Court pointed out, “[u]nder
the IRCA regime, it is impossible for an undocumented alien to
obtain employment in the United States without some party directly
105
contravening explicit congressional policies.”
Under ERISA, however, courts do not have the remedial
106
discretion that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) does.
Nevertheless, an argument can be made, applying the majority’s
reasoning in Hoffman Plastics, that awarding employee benefits to
undocumented workers would “run[] counter to policies underlying
IRCA.”107 Permitting benefits to those who are here illegally in the
United States would, according to the Supreme Court, “encourage
the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities,
condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage
future violations.”108 Thus, if Hoffman Plastics is deemed to apply to

101. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000).
103. See id. § 1324a(b). This is the familiar I-9 verification of employment form that
employers have to fill out for their employees on the commencement of the employee’s
employment.
104. See id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A); see also id. § 1324(f)(1).
105. Hoffman Plastics Compound, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002).
106. See National Labor Relations Act of 1935 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000) (“NLRA”). See
also NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612, n.32 (1969) (noting that the Board “draws
on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be
given special respect by reviewing courts”).
107. Hoffman Plastics, 535 U.S. at 149.
108. Id. at 151. See also Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984) (“[E]mployees
must be deemed ‘unavailable’ for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore tolled) during any
period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States.”).
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the ERISA context, an undocumented worker probably would not be
109
eligible for benefits, or to sue for benefits, under ERISA.
At the same time, lower courts and government agencies have
found undocumented workers eligible for remedies under other labor
110
statutes after Hoffman Plastics. In Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R. Oil,
for example, the district court in the Northern District of California
held that Hoffman Plastics did not preclude an undocumented
worker’s retaliation action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (FLSA),111 which regulates wages, hours, and child labor in the
112
workplace. The Singh court distinguished the Hoffman Plastics case
by establishing that, unlike the employer in Hoffman Plastics, the
employer in Singh knew of the worker’s undocumented status and
was allegedly withholding from Singh unpaid wages rather than back
pay.113
114
Similarly, in Patel v. Quality Inn South, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that undocumented workers are “employees” under
115
Section 3(e) of the FLSA for many of the same reasons mentioned
116
in Singh. Indeed, the court noted that if it were otherwise,
employers “might find it economically advantageous to hire and
underpay undocumented workers and run the risk of sanctions under
the IRCA.”117 Harkening back to the language of Hoffman Plastics
about the federal policy underling IRCA, the court pointed out that
giving employers an incentive to hire undocumented workers by
denying employees remedies under the FLSA would run contrary to

109. However, Hoffman Plastics does not answer the question whether undocumented
workers are statutory employees under Section 2(3) of the NLRA. A recent, influential Court
of Appeals decision, Agri Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008), petition for cert.
filed (June 30, 2008) (No. 08-21), suggests that they are. In a 2-1 decision, the D.C. Circuit
reaffirmed that undocumented workers are employees under the NLRA even if not entitled to
back pay under Hoffman Plastics. Id. at 3. See also Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. 883 (pre-Hoffman
Plastics and IRCA, finding undocumented workers to be “employees” under NLRA).
110. 214 F.Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
111. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
112. Singh, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1061-62.
113. Id. (“Hoffman does not establish that an award of unpaid wages to undocumented
workers for work actually performed runs counter to IRCA.” (citing Flores v. Albertsons, Inc.,
2002 WL 1163623 (C.D. Cal. 2002))).
114. 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988).
115. § 203(e)(1) (2002).
116. Patel, 846 F.2d at 704-05.
117. Id. at 704.
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the federal policy underlying IRCA.118 Other federal courts examining
the impact of Hoffman Plastics on the remedies available to
undocumented workers under the FLSA have come to similar
conclusions.119
In short, the FLSA cases invoking Hoffman Plastics suggest
another way that courts may choose to address the issue of federal
immigration policy preemption in the ERISA context. Following the
logic of these cases, a court might conclude that by not following the
remedial scheme of ERISA, employers would be given incentive to
hire undocumented workers, counter to the federal policy contained
in IRCA.120
In addition to this case law that casts some uncertainty as to the
impact of the Hoffman Plastics holding on ERISA, the Wage and
Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor, responsible for
enforcing the FLSA, has supported extending ERISA protections to
undocumented workers; as it noted in a Fact Sheet issued after the
Hoffman Plastics decision: “The Department’s Wage and Hour
Division will continue to enforce the FLSA [Fair Labor Standards
Act] and MSPA [Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act] without regard to whether an employee is
121
documented or undocumented.” Similarly, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the primary agency responsible
for enforcing Title VII’s prohibitions on employment discrimination
based on race or national origin, issued a press release which stated
that, “[w]hile Hoffman affects the availability of some forms of relief
118. Id.
119. Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Cortez v. Medina’s
Landscaping, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2002); Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l,
Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
120. Additionally, a trend among state courts involving workers’ compensation statutes may
indicate that courts would be unwilling to let employers avoid complying with ERISA with
regard to their undocumented workers. Although these decisions concededly involve state law,
the reasoning behind these decisions resonates with the FLSA cases discussed above when they
conclude that failing to enforce employment laws as regards undocumented workers would also
undermine the federal immigration policy under IRCA. See, e.g., Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d
396 (Conn. 1998) (holding that excluding undocumented workers from workers’ compensation
statues would encourage employers to take advantage of the workers and undermine IRCA);
Ruiz v. Belk Masonry Co., Inc., 559 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
undocumented workers are covered by workers’ compensation provisions).
121. See WAGE AND HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #48: APPLICATION OF
U.S. LABOR LAWS TO IMMIGRANT WORKERS: EFFECT OF HOFFMAN PLASTICS DECISION ON
LAWS ENFORCED BY THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION (2007), http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/regs
/compliance/whdfs48.pdf.
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to undocumented workers, make no mistake, it is still illegal for
122
employers to discriminate against undocumented workers.” Thus,
there is a possibility that if the Employee Benefits Security
Administration, the government agency in charge of the labor123
oriented provisions of ERISA, were to follow the approach of the
Wage and Hour Division and the EEOC, ERISA would still cover
undocumented workers in the United States, even as certain types of
relief might be unavailable to them.
Moreover, because Hoffman Plastics was a closely-divided 5-4
decision, it is plausible that the Supreme Court could decide to adopt
the reasoning of Justice Breyer’s dissent in Hoffman Plastics for the
ERISA context. A court following this analysis could note that
ERISA certainly applies to undocumented workers as employees and
then point out that there is nothing in IRCA which says that
undocumented workers cannot keep their benefits:
[IRCA’s] language itself does not explicitly state how a
violation is to effect the enforcement of other laws, such as
the labor laws. What is to happen, for example, when an
employer hires, or an alien works, in violation of these
provisions? Must the alien forfeit all pay earned? May the
employer ignore the labor laws?124
Indeed, the lower courts FLSA decisions discussed above adopted
this exact approach.
Consider, for instance, Patel in this regard: “By reducing the
incentive to hire such workers the FLSA’s coverage of undocumented
aliens helps discourage illegal immigration and is thus fully consistent
125
with the objectives of the IRCA.” Perhaps a future court will, along
similar lines, find that the IRCA does not require an undocumented
worker to forfeit his or her health benefits or retirement monies
because such policies would give employers the incentive to hire
undocumented workers in violation of IRCA policy. Indeed, a court
122. See Press Release, Equal Opportunity Employment Comm’n, EEOC Reaffirms
Commitment to Protecting Undocumented Workers from Discrimination (June 28, 2002),
http://www.eeoc.gov/press /6-28-02.html (quoting Commissioner Leslie E. Silverman).
123. While the labor provisions are administered by the Employee Benefits Security
Administration (EBSA), the tax provisions are administered by the Department of Treasury.
See RICHARD A. BALES, JEFFREY M. HIRSCH & PAUL M. SECUNDA, UNDERSTANDING
EMPLOYMENT LAW 197 (2007).
124. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 154-55 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
125. Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 F. 2d, 700, 704-05 (11th Cir. 1988).
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might follow the lead of Patel and conclude that ERISA “is an area in
which decisions under the NLRA are not helpful in interpreting [it],”
and that, “[n]othing in [ERISA] suggests that undocumented aliens
cannot recover [benefits] under [it].”126 Under such an approach, an
undocumented worker would be entitled to the full range of available
remedies under ERISA without regard to his or her immigration
status.
Alternatively, a court considering this issue might, as a matter of
first impression, find that remedies under the NLRA and ERISA are
different enough that the Hoffman Plastics analysis should not apply
at all. Under this line of reasoning, a court could find that back pay
remedies are not available under ERISA’s civil enforcement
scheme.127 ERISA places less emphasis on individual victim
compensation.128 This legal orientation might mean that courts would
be more likely to focus on undocumented workers being able to fulfill
the ERISA policy of having employees report illegal employer or
fiduciary conduct to the appropriate government authorities.129
Needless to say, what will happen in this area of ERISA law in
the future is uncertain. Regardless of whether undocumented workers
are eligible for employee benefits, they will still come to work in the
130
131
United States and employers will still hire them. This does not
126. Id. at 706 (interpreting the FLSA).
127. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (interpreting “appropriate equitable
relief” in § 502(a)(3) to mean injunctions, mandamus, or restitution, but not money damages
such as compensatory or punitive damages). Additionally, there is now a more significant
argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), does not permit back pay for wrongful termination as an
equitable remedy under ERISA Section 502(a)(3). See, e.g., Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that back pay as equitable relief is not available
under § 502(a)(3) for violation of ERISA § 510). But see Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S.
200, 222 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“As the array of lower court cases and opinions
documents, fresh consideration of the availability of consequential damages under § 502(a)(3) is
plainly in order.”).
128. For example, the fiduciary breach provision provides relief to the plan as a whole
rather to individual participants or beneficiaries. See ERISA §§ 502(a)(2), 409.
129. See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 62 (2d ed. 2007) (describing the twin policy objectives of ERISA’s reporting and
disclosure requirements as “providing sufficient information to participants so that they can
‘self-police’ the administration of their employee benefit plans and deterring fiduciary
misconduct”).
130. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 155 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting the “attractive force of employment, which like a ‘magnet’ pulls illegal immigrants
toward the United States.” (citing H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 45 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649)).
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mean, however, that these problems are not important enough for
undocumented workers and that, accordingly, Congress should give
up on passing comprehensive immigration reform to address these
questions. Certain members of Congress have already under
proposed legislation, including the Secure America and Orderly
Immigration Act of 2005, attempted to ensure that132
[a] nonimmigrant alien [temporary or guest worker] . . . shall
not be denied any right or remedy under Federal, State, or
local labor or employment law that would be applicable to a
United States worker employed in a similar position with the
employer because of the alien’s status as a nonimmigrant
worker.133
If such provisions were to become law, at least recognized, foreign
temporary or guest workers would be covered by ERISA on the same
terms as U.S. citizens, eliminating much of the uncertainty currently
surrounding employee benefits law related to such workers. And as
long as foreign workers are in the United States in some form of
government-sanctioned program, and perhaps even if they are not,134
they should be able enjoy the fruits of their labor, including the ability
to maintain health insurance and to save for retirement for
themselves and their families. A just global employee benefits system
demands no less.
CONCLUSION
One of the most neglected areas of employee benefits law in the
United States today is the extraterritorial application of ERISA to
U.S. employees in other countries. Additionally, the courts and
legislature have not spent the necessary time to discuss ERISA
coverage issues for foreign employees in the United States, whether

131. Id. (noting that the lack of back pay to prevent to deter labor law violations against
undocumented workers “increases the employer’s incentive to find and to hire illegal-alien
employees”). M. Patricia Fernandez Kelly explains the attraction of immigrants for employers:
“many of them are not citizens. Accordingly, immigrants assess working conditions, wage levels,
and quality of life by comparison to their point of origin, not to their point of destination. As a
result, immigrants tend to be less demanding and more compliant than native United States
citizens.” M. Patricia Fernandez Kelly, Underclass and Immigrant Women as Economic Actors:
Rethinking Citizenship in a Changing Global Economy, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 151, 153
(1993).
132. S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005).
133. Id. § 304(h)(3); see also id. § 304(h)(5) (providing the same “benefits” to nonimmigrant
workers as U.S. workers).
134. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text.
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legal or illegal and whether working for foreign government or nongovernment employers. This is an increasingly crucial area of
employee benefits law as the globalization of the world’s workplaces
continues apace.
After surveying the tangled web of ERISA law in this context,
the article proposes two statutory fixes and one new path for courts to
take in applying employment benefits law in the immigration milieu.
First, Congress should amend ERISA to add ERISA § 4(b)(6) to
provide ERISA coverage for American employees working abroad as
long as ERISA does not conflict with the laws of a foreign country.
Such a law would make clear that ERISA’s extraterritorial
application is of a limited nature and does not extend to foreign
employees working abroad for American companies or their
subsidiaries. Second, Congress should pass comprehensive
immigration legislation and include within that legislation a provision
that would make clear that documented workers maintain the same
rights to employee benefits under ERISA as any other U.S. citizen.
Third, courts should consider ERISA policies and the dissenting
opinion in Hoffman Plastics to support a conclusion that
undocumented workers should remain eligible for all appropriate
relief under ERISA.
These steps may appear fairly modest for one who wishes to see
concrete movement toward a more coherent, global employee benefit
scheme, but to quote Lao Tzu: “The tallest tree begins as a tiny
sprout, the highest monument, as a clod of dirt, the longest journey,
with a first step.”135

135. LAO TZU, TAO TE CHING ¶ 64 (Ned Ludd trans.), http://www.terebess.hu/english/tao/
ludd .html (last visited September 17, 2008).

